Authority versus Persuasion by Eric J. Van den Steen
 
Copyright © 2009 by Eric Van den Steen 
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and 
discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working 
papers are available from the author. 
 
 
Authority versus Persuasion 
 








 Authority versus Persuasion
Prepared for the 2009 AEA Annual Meeting in San Francisco
Session `Beliefs and Disagreement in Organizations'
Eric Van den Steen
January 7, 2009
Abstract
This paper studies a principal's trade-o between using persuasion versus using
interpersonal authority to get the agent to `do the right thing' from the principal's
perspective (when the principal and agent openly disagree on the right course of action).
It shows that persuasion and authority are complements at low levels of eectiveness
but substitutes at high levels. Furthermore, the principal will rely more on persuasion
when agent motivation is more important for the execution of the project, when the
agent has strong intrinsic or extrinsic incentives, and, for a wide range of settings, when
the principal is more condent about the right course of action.
Managers often face a choice between authority and persuasion. In particular, since a
rm's formal and relational contracts and its culture and norms are quite rigid in the short
term, a manager who needs to prevent an employee from undertaking the wrong action
has the choice between either trying to persuade this employee or relying on interpersonal
authority.1 Herbert Simon (1947) noted, for example, that `when ... disagreement is not
resolved by discussion, persuasion, or other means of conviction, then it must be decided
by the authority of one or the other participant' and that `in actual practice [...] authority
is liberally admixed with suggestion and persuasion.' Obviously, in choosing between per-
suasion and authority the manager makes a cost-benet trade-o. This paper studies that
trade-o, focusing in particular on agency con
icts that originate in open disagreement, in
the sense of diering priors.
Van den Steen: Harvard Business School, 15 Harvard Way, Boston MA 02163, evandensteen@hbs.edu.
This paper benetted from the discussion by Navin Kartik and from discussions with John Roberts and Bob
Gibbons. I am also grateful to Roland Benabou for organizing the session.
1Interpersonal authority can be dened as `the right or power to give orders and enforce obedience.'
Kenneth J. Arrow (1974) stated that `the giving and taking of orders ... is an essential part of the mechanism
by which organizations function' while Simon (1947) observed that `(o)f all the modes of in
uence, authority
is the one that chie
y distinguishes the behavior of individuals as participants of organizations from their
behavior outside such organizations.'
1To that purpose, I will study a setting in which a principal and an agent are involved in a
project. The project's outcome depends both on decisions and on implementation eort by
the agent, i.e., on eort to execute the decisions. A key issue is that the principal and agent
may openly disagree on which decisions are most likely to lead to a success even though no
player has private information, i.e. the players have diering priors. For such setting, Eric
Van den Steen (2002, 2004) and, independently, Yeon-Koo Che and Navin Kartik (2007)
showed that open disagreement gives rise to persuasion in a very natural way: each player
believes that new information will conrm her prior and thus `persuade' the other. It is
exactly this type of persuasion that I will study here.2 Apart from such persuasion by
collecting new information, I will also allow the principal to impose interpersonal authority,
i.e., to make it costly for the agent to disobey an order of the principal. The sources of such
interpersonal authority in a setting with open disagreement were studied in Van den Steen
(2007), which showed that a rm, with its low-powered incentives and asset ownership, may
be an important vehicle to convey authority to a principal. In this paper, I will use a reduced
form that simply imposes a cost on the agent if he disobeys the principal.
Probably the most important result of this paper is that the principal will rely more on
persuasion for projects with a high need for motivation or eort. The reason is that { under
the assumption that implementation eort is a complement to correct decisions, i.e., that
executing a good project is more valuable than executing a bad project { the agent will exert
more eort if he believes more in the project. From the manager's perspective, persuasion
will thus motivate the agent. This makes, on its turn, persuasion more attractive on projects
where eort or motivation are more important.
Since persuasion can cause compliance even in the absence of authority, it seems that an
increase in persuasion should lead to a decrease in the reliance on authority. This is only
partially true, however: persuasion and authority can be both substitutes and complements.
In particular, I will show that authority and persuasion are substitutes when authority is
highly eective but complements when authority is not very eective. To see why, note that
if authority alone is not sucient to make the agent comply but the combination of authority
and persuasion is, then authority is more attractive in the presence of persuasion and vice-
versa, making them complements. In the other extreme, i.e. at high eectiveness, there
are actually two mechanisms that make authority and persuasion substitutes. First, if both
2There is another natural form of persuasion in a context with diering priors. Suppose that players
with diering priors may also have private information. The combination of information and priors makes
observing others' beliefs insucient to infer their private information. Communication of private information
may then serve to `persuade' others. As shown in Van den Steen (2004), players will want to communicate
information that conrms their belief to `persuade' the other and will want to hide information that contra-
dicts their beliefs. Obviously, weak attempts at `persuasion' will be interpreted as a negative signal. But in
the context of this paper's model, persuasion would again lead to motivation.
2authority and persuasion induce compliance then some of the potential (compliance) benets
of each have already been realized by the other, so that persuasion becomes less attractive
in the presence of authority and vice versa. A second mechanism comes from the fact that
persuasion may actually fail { when the new information contradicts the principal's belief
{ and then `wake up sleeping dogs.' In particular, if the (persuasion) signal conrms the
agent's view then an agent who would have obeyed otherwise may now decide not to obey.
In that case, persuasion weakens authority, making authority and persuasion substitutes.
It further follows that more important eort or motivation will make the principal rely less
on authority in the case that authority is very eective. Finally, authority and persuasion
being substitutes also implies, from the perspective of the principal, a trade-o between
motivation and cooperation. This trade-o is recognized as one of the fundamental issues in
organization design (John Roberts 2004).
Another interesting, but less central, result is that the principal will rely more on per-
suasion (without authority) when agents have strong pay-for-performance incentives. The
reason is that incentives and condence in the project work multiplicatively. More intuitively:
if the agent does not care about the outcome, then there is little gain from persuading him.
Finally, there is also a positive relationship between the condence of the principal and the
use of persuasion (unless eort is not important and authority is very eective). This is
caused by the fact that a more condent manager is more convinced that she will persuade
the agent, making persuasion more attractive in her eyes. The reason why this relationship
does not hold everywhere is that a more condent manager also cares more about the em-
ployee choosing the (subjectively) `correct' action, which can make authority more attractive
when eort is unimportant and authority is very eective.
Apart from the work already mentioned, this paper is related to a number of strands
in the literature. The rst is work on persuasion, such as Paul Milgrom (1981), Vincent
Crawford and Joel Sobel (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), or Mathias Dewatripont and
Jean Tirole (1999), and work on belief formation, such as Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole
(2006) or Benabou (2008). The second is work that compares dierent modes of decision-
making related to authority and persuasion such as Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997)
or Wouter Dessein (2007). Of particular interest is also Benabou and Tirole (2002) who
studied the connection between condence and motivation, although they study condence
about one's own abilities rather than condence about the quality of a project. These two
are not unrelated, however: skill and project quality both aect how eort translates into
output. That relationship is re
ected in the fact that both papers's results are aected by
whether eort is a complement to { versus a substitute for { skill or project quality. The two
do have very dierent interpretations and very dierent implications, however. Finally, the
3mechanism for motivation in this paper is also related to the result in Van den Steen (2006)
that delegation motivates an agent when principal and agent disagree on the optimal course
of action: the agent will believe more strongly in projects that he chose himself and thus be
more motivated. The dierence between that paper and the current model is obviously that
in this paper motivation gets induced by persuasion rather than by delegation.
The next Section lays out the model. Section 2 presents the results while Section 3
concludes. All proofs are in appendix.
1 Model
Consider a setting in which an agent executes a project for a principal. The project will be
either a success or a failure. A success gives the principal and the agent respective payos

P;
A  0 while their payos upon failure are normalized to 0. The project's probability of
success (Q) depends on two decisions (D1 and D2) and on implementation eort (e) by the
agent. The eort e 2 [0;1] is chosen by the agent at private cost c(e), specied below. Each
decision Dk is a choice from the set Dk 2 fX;Y g, one and only one of which is correct as
captured by the state variable S 2 fX;Y g, which is the same for both decisions.
The state S is unknown, but each player i has a subjective belief about S. A key
assumption is that (it is common knowledge that) players have diering priors, i.e., they can
disagree about S even though neither has private information.3 Since the players may have
diering priors but have no private information about S, they will not update their beliefs
when they meet someone with a dierent belief: they simply accept that people sometimes
disagree. To keep the analysis simple, I will immediately assume that the principal and
the agent disagree on S. In particular, it is common knowledge that the principal believes
that S = X with probability P > :5 while the agent believes that S = Y with probability
A > :5.4 Note that the i are the players' condence in their beliefs.
With dk = IDk=S the indicator function that decision Dk is correct and with ;  0
(with  +  < 1) parameters that capture the importance of pure decision making and of
implementation eort, the probability of success equals Q = d1+d2e. This is the simplest
functional form that captures all elements necessary to bring out the intuition of the paper.
The rst term of Q depends completely on a decision by the agent and its importance
is measured by . The second term depends on the agent's implementation eort, with
3See Stephen Morris (1995), Muhamet Yildiz (2000), or Van den Steen (2007) for more discussion of
diering priors.
4This assumption is made to simplify the model. See Van den Steen (2007) for a setting where the beliefs
are private information, the principal gives an `order', and `disobedience' is disregarding the order. The
results of this paper would extend to such a context.
4implementation eort a complement to the decision D2 so that eort to implement a good
project is more valuable than eort to implement a bad project, an assumption that I will
discuss below. To simplify the analysis (considerably), I will also assume that the principal
gets full and free compliance on D2, so that it is as if the principal chooses D2 and so that
compliance and authority only matter for D1. While this functional form for Q is not the
most elegant, it is very transparent and will make it very clear what is driving the results.5
The timing of the game is very simple. First, in period 1, the principal can try to convince
the agent by drawing, at a private cost cp, a signal about the state of the world. The drawing
and the signal itself are publicly observed.6 The signal is commonly known to be correct with
probability p. At the same time with her decision to draw a signal or not, the principal also
decides whether to exert interpersonal authority. Exerting interpersonal authority, which
comes at a private cost ca to the principal, makes it costly for the agent to undertake an
action against the will of the principal. In particular, the agent will incur a private cost cd
from choosing Y rather than X, i.e., from `disobedience.'
In period 2, once the principal has decided on authority and persuasion, both players
(simultaneously) choose their actions: the principal (essentially) chooses D2 while the agent
chooses D1 and e. The cost of implementation eort to the agent equals c(e) =  e2
2 . The
(only) reason to normalize eort by  is to make very clear that the results are not driven
by the fact that eort would become cheaper (on a relative basis, in the absence of this
normalization) when the part that depends on eort becomes more important. The decisions
are non-contractible and each player is free to choose any decision he or she wants, taking
into account the private and public costs and benets.
In period 3, the state is revealed and the project outcome is realized. The players then
get the benets 
A and 
P upon success. No further contracting on outcomes or payos is
possible, so that these payos are completely exogenously given. All players are risk-neutral
and thus simply maximize the expected value of their project payos minus any private
costs.
In terms of parameters, I will assume that P > A and P > p. The rst ensures that
the principal will always follow her own beliefs while the second ensures that the signal never
5Very similar results obtain in a similar setting with Q = [d1+e]d2 and independent decisions. In that
case, the principal's decision is a complement to the agent's full productivity. The main results also seem to
hold without the assumption for the original Q that the principal gets free and full compliance on D2, but
at the cost of a considerable increase in complexity. See Rosen (1982) for a motivation why the principal's
decision and the agent's eort would be complements.
6As pointed out by the discussant, Navin Kartik, the results would also hold if the signal was only
observed by the agent. An interesting alternative formulation that ts some settings better would be to let
the principal rst observe the outcome of her persuasion attempt before deciding on authority.
5changes the principal's mind.7 These assumptions exclude some cases that, while sometimes
interesting in their own right for dierent reasons, do not contribute to the analysis of this
paper. To simplify the statements and analysis, I will also assume that when indierent each
player does what the other prefers, not only on the action choice but also for persuasion and
authority. That implies that the principal will use persuasion when indierent but will not
use authority when indierent. Finally, all costs are non-negative.
2 Results
Let me start by showing that authority and persuasion are complements when interpersonal
authority is not very eective and substitutes when it is very eective. To state this formally,
remember that exerting interpersonal authority implies that the agent incurs a cost cd when
going against the principal's beliefs. The agent is thus more likely to obey when cd is higher,
so that cd is a good measure for the eectiveness of authority. In fact, cd can be interpreted
directly as a measure of the agent's `zone of acceptance' or `zone of indierence.' The
following Proposition then captures the result.
Proposition 1 Authority and persuasion are complements when cd < 
A(2A   1) and
substitutes when cd  
A(2A   1).
The intuition for this result was explained in the introduction. The non-symmetric nature of
the result, i.e., the fact that the eectiveness of authority plays a role but not the eectiveness
of persuasion, may be slightly surprising. This seems to be partially due to the way that
persuasion is conceptualized here. In particular, it seems that persuasion along the lines
of footnote 2 would result in a more symmetric result. This, and especially its further
implications, seems an interesting direction for future research.
I now turn to the most important result of the paper: that the manager will use more
persuasion when employee eort or motivation is more important.
Proposition 2 The set of parameters for which the principal uses persuasion increases in
. The set of parameters for which the principal uses authority decreases in  if cd 

A(2A   1).
The intuition is that, with eort complementary to making the right decisions, persuading the
agent will increase his eort or motivation. When eort becomes more important, persuasion
7If P < A, then the principal may prefer to choose the agent's preferred action on D2 since the
motivating eect can dominate the cost of choosing the (subjectively) `wrong' action (Van den Steen 2006).
While this is an interesting observation, it would considerably complicate the analysis without, it seems,
adding anything to the central arguments of this paper.
6becomes more attractive and will thus be used more. The negative eect on authority when
authority is relatively strong is caused by the fact that the two are substitutes in that case.
This result relies on the assumption that implementation eort is a complement to making
the right decisions, i.e., that eort to execute the project is more valuable for good projects
than for bad projects. (The case with substitutes is not analyzed here, but I conjecture that
the result would go the other way.) This obviously raises the question whether it is indeed the
case that eort and decisions are complements. An important element here is the fact that the
paper has focused on eort to implement or execute the project rather than on what one could
term `corrective eort' which compensates for shortcomings in the project. While the latter
is usually a substitute, the rst is typically a complement. Of course, unless these two can be
distinguished empirically, that only redenes the question. A more direct indication is the
work of, among others, Sherwin Rosen (1982) and Michael Kremer (1993) who argued that
there will be complementarities among worker (or managerial) productivities and provide
empirical evidence supporting this. In fact, Rosen (1982) explicitly assumes that the quality
of a manager's decision aects the output of employees multiplicatively, as in this model.
An interesting implication of this result is that there is, in the manager's eyes, a trade-
o between motivation and cooperation when authority is very eective, as is clear from a
graphical representation of the equilibria. This trade-o is a well-known issue in organization
design (Roberts 2004). Other explanations of this trade-o include Susan Athey and John
Roberts (2001), Wouter Dessein, Luis Garicano, and Robert Gertner (2005), and Van den
Steen (2006). As pointed out elsewhere, sorting on beliefs (`hiring for t') may often resolve
this con
ict.
A closely related result is that the manager will rely more on persuasion by itself when
the agent has higher incentives 
A. The reason is that higher incentives imply a higher
base-level of eort and thus a stronger eect of persuasion. To say this in a more intuitive
way: persuading someone who is indierent about the outcome has very little eect.
Proposition 3 The set of parameters for which the principal uses persuasion by itself in-
creases in 
A.
The reason why this result only holds for `persuasion by itself' is that a change in 
A may also
aect under which conditions the agent obeys. This may, on its turn, aect the area where
the principal uses both authority and persuasion through very dierent mechanisms. The
results would hold for persuasion in general when conditioning on `no change in obedience.'
One would also expect a more condent manager to rely more on persuasion. In partic-
ular, a more condent principal believes more strongly that she will be able to persuade the
agent, resulting in increased eort by the agent and potentially also in increased compliance.
7That should make persuasion more attractive. There is, however, a counter-acting eect: a
principal who is more condent about the right course of action will care more about making
sure that the agent follows that course of action. Since persuasion generates at most partial
compliance, a more condent principal may therefore also want to use more authority. This
can make the result go the other direction when authority and persuasion are substitutes.
It turns out, however, that the latter only happens when simultaneously authority is very
eective and eort is not important (in a relative sense):
Proposition 4 When cd < 
A(2A  1) then the set of parameters for which the principal
uses persuasion increases in P. When cd  
A(2A  1), then there exists an   0 (which
may be function of all parameters but  and ) such that the set of parameters for which the
principal uses persuasion increases in P when = > .
One potential issue that could be raised { for the paper as a whole { is whether the absence
of explicit incentives or the absence of authority over eort may be important limitations of
the analysis. This does not seem to be the case. Even when the principal could also impose
interpersonal authority over eort, persuasion will still play a role either as a substitute or as
a complement (depending on the eectiveness of this type of authority). This would thus add
more elements and trade-os but would not undo the results. Incentives are actually a very
interesting issue: while they indeed raise eort, they simultaneously create more problems
for obedience (as can be easily seen from the condition under which the agent `obeys' for D1)
since they give the agent more reason to disobey (Van den Steen 2007). But again, while
eort incentives may aect the trade-o between authority and persuasion, they do not seem
to undo it. Note also that the role of diering priors is to make sense of `persuasion' as it is
typically understood: with two players disagreeing, one player trying to systematically move
the opinion of the other in one's own direction.
3 Conclusion
This paper studied a setting with open disagreement where a principal can use authority or
persuasion to get compliance but also cares about the agent's eort in executing the decision.
The main result is that a principal will rely more on persuasion for projects with a
high need for (implementation) eort. It also showed that persuasion and authority are
complements when authority is relatively ineective but substitutes when authority is very
eective. This may provide a partial explanation for the well-known motivation-cooperation
trade-o. Finally, the principal will also rely more on persuasion (without authority) when
agents have higher pay-for-performance incentives.
8The paper focused on persuasion by means of collecting new information, but also pointed
to persuasion mechanisms by means of existing information. This seems to be an interesting
avenue for future research.
9A Appendix
Subsection A.1 determines the equilibria and, based on that, Subsection A.2 gives the proofs
of the Propositions.
A.1 Equilibria
Persuasion and Beliefs Before starting the backwards induction, let me determine the
players' beliefs when the principal does collect new information. Remember that P was





i when the signal respectively contradicted or conrmed i's belief. (Note
















(1   p)i + p(1   i)
Furthermore, the fact that P > p implies that 
 
P > :5 so that the principal always believes
that X is more likely to succeed.
The Decision and Eort of the Agent I now start the backwards induction. The fact
that the project payo is additively separable in the agent's eort and decision allows me
to treat them independently. For the agent's eort, let A(d2) be the agent's belief in the






So that the optimal eort ^ e = 
AA(d2). Note that this will depend on the principal's
decision (through A(d2)).
The agent's choice of D1 trades o the benet from following his own belief against the
cost of disobedience. Let ~ A be the agent's belief that Y is most likely to succeed. Taking
into account that P always prefers X and that the agent does as the principal wants when
indierent, the agent will choose X (i.e., obey) i

A(1   ~ A)  
A~ A   cd
or
cd  









Note that this is completely independent from the principal's decision on D2. One implication
is that the agent always complies when ~ A  1




the case when p  A).
The Decision of the Principal Since the principal chooses his decision D2 simultaneously
with the agent's decision and with the agent's choice of eort, she takes the level of eort
as given. It is then a dominant strategy for the principal to choose X (given that :5 <

 
P < P < 
+
P and that her expected payo from D2 equals 
PP(d2)e where P(d2) is the
principal's belief in the action she chooses for D2).
It then follows that the subgame starting in period 2 is uniquely determined by the
parameters. In particular, the principal always chooses D2 = X, the agent always chooses
^ e = 




A and D1 = Y otherwise.
To determine now the equilibria, it is useful to distinguish dierent cases along two
dimensions. The rst is the strength of persuasion. The key here is whether 
 
A  :5 or
not. In particular, if 
 
A > :5 then the agent always chooses Y absent authority (`weak
persuasion'), but if 
 
A  :5 then the agent does choose X, even absent authority, when
the signal conrms the principal's belief (`strong persuasion'). The second dimension is the
strength of authority. There are 4 cases that matter here:
1. cd  
A(2
+




A 1) > cd  
A(2A 1) so that the agent obeys unless the principal collected
information and that conrmed the agent's view (`A authority'),
3. 
A(2A   1) > cd  
A(2
 
A   1) so that the agent obeys only when the principal






A   1) > cd so that the agent never obeys (`no authority').









A  :5, which is impossible. This leaves 7 cases to be considered.
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P(P + p   1)
Note that since :5 < p < P, 0 < a < a.
The choice for persuasion and/or authority now completely depends on the principal's
expected utility. I will use UP, UP
a , UP
p , and UP
ap for the principal's utility (excluding the costs
of persuasion or authority) when, respectively, she uses neither authority nor persuasion, she
uses only authority, she uses only persuasion, and she uses both authority and persuasion. I
now study case by case.
Weak persuasion (
 
A > :5), strong authority Remember that in this case, the agent
always obeys upon authority but never chooses X absent authority.
If the principal does not use either authority or persuasion, the agent chooses Y and the
principal's expected utility becomes:
U
P = 
P(1   P) + 
A
PP(1   A)












P(2P   1) = a
If she uses `persuasion only', her expected utility becomes
U
P
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P = p   p = 0
Since the criteria for persuasion and authority are completely independent, the equilibria for
this case are thus:
 The principal will use persuasion whenever cp  p.
 The principal will use authority whenever ca < a.
Strong persuasion (
 
A  :5 < A), strong authority. The outcomes without persua-
sion are obviously identical to the ones above:
U
P = 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13If she uses `persuasion only', the principal's expected utility is
U
P
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= a + p











= a   a + p < p
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P = p   (a + p) < 0
so that persuasion and authority are substitutes.
To nd the equilibria, note that if cp  p then there will always be persuasion. If
p < cp  a+p then there will be `persuasion only' absent authority. And if a+p < cp
then there will never be persuasion.
Furthermore, if ca < a   a then there will always be authority. If a   a  ca < a
then there will be `authority only' when there is no persuasion. Finally, when ca  a then
there will be no authority at all.
The one issue remaining is what happens when authority and persuasion are both possible





a = a   a + p  cp   ca
The equilibria are thus as follows:
 If cp  p, then there is always persuasion. Moreover, there is also authority i
ca < a   a.
 If p < cp  p + a then we have the following:
14{ If ca < cp   (p   a + a) then the principal uses authority.
{ If ca  cp   (p   a + a) then the principal uses persuasion.
 If cp > p + a then there is never persuasion. If ca < a then there is authority.
Weak persuasion, A-authority The payos for UP, UP
p , and UP
a are unchanged from
the case with weak persuasion and strong authority:
U
P = 





















P(2P   1) = a
When using both authority and persuasion, the employee only obeys when the signal conrms
the principal's belief, so that the principal's expected utility equals:
U
P
















































p + UP = p   a + a   p < 0.












= p   a
The equilibrium is then as follows:
 If cp  p   a + a then always persuasion. Moreover, the principal will also use
authority if ca < a.
 If p   a + a < cp  p then she will use persuasion if cp  ca + p   a and
authority otherwise.
 If p < cp then she will never use persuasion but she will use `authority only' if ca < a.
Strong persuasion, A-authority Under persuasion, only 
 
A would obey when exerting
authority, but 
 
A would comply anyways since persuasion is strong, so that UP
ap = UP
p . It
15follows that authority and persuasion are completely exclusive. When using only author-
ity or only persuasion, this case is identical to the case with strong authority (and strong
persuasion).
The equilibrium is then as follows:
 If cp  p + a and
{ if ca < cp   (p   a + a) then authority.
{ If ca  cp   (p   a + a) then persuasion.
 If cp > p + a then there is never persuasion. If ca < a then there is authority.
It also follows that UP
ap   UP
a   UP
p + UP =  a < 0.
Weak persuasion, 
 
A-authority In this case, authority when used alone is never obeyed,
so that UP
a = UP and authority alone cannot be optimal. On the other hand, the payos
for UP and UP
p are the same as in the case with weak persuasion but strong authority:
U
P = 











The principal's utility when using both persuasion and authority equals
U
P
















































P = a > 0
So the equilibrium is then as follows:
 If cp  p then the principal always uses persuasion. Moreover, the principal will also
use authority if ca < a.
 If cp > p, then the principal will use both authority and persuasion if cp+ca < p+a.
Otherwise the principal uses neither of the two.
16Strong persuasion, 
 
A-authority In this case, authority has no eect (since an agent
with belief A does not obey, while an agent with 
 
A would obey but complies anyways even







a +UP = 0. The utilities for UP, UP
p , and thus UP
p  UP are the same
as in the case of `strong persuasion, strong authority'. It follows that the equilibrium is that
the principal will use persuasion i cp  p + a.




a = UP so that UP
ap   UP
p   UP
a + UP = 0. The utilities for UP, UP
p , and
thus UP
p   UP are the same as in the case of `weak persuasion, strong authority'. It follows
that the equilibrium is that the principal will use persuasion i cp  p.
A.2 Proofs





a + UP  0 and for each of the cases with cd  




a + UP  0. These follow from the derivations of the equilibria. That con-
cludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Note rst that the boundaries between the dierent cases are
independent of . It thus suces to show this case by case. Note also that p increases in
, while a and a are independent of . It follows that we can simply consider the eect of
an increase in p. In what follows, I will assume that cp changes along the horizontal axis
and ca changes along the vertical axis when describing regions in the parameter space.
The result is straightforward for the cases with weak persuasion and either strong authority
or no authority and for the case with strong persuasion and 
 
A-authority.
Consider next the case with strong persuasion and strong authority. Points that are origi-
nally in the cp  p region are not aected by an increase in p. Points that are originally
in the cp > p + a either remain in that region and are not aected or become part of the
middle region. But any such point with ca  a then falls in the persuasion part. Any
such point with ca < a either remains `authority only' or becomes `persuasion only'. It
follows that the Proposition holds for these two regions. Consider nally points that are
in the middle region. Any such point that satised ca  cp   (p   a + a) and that
remains in the middle region will still satisfy that condition. Any such point that satised
ca < cp   (p   a + a) and that remains in the middle region either remains `authority
only' or becomes `persuasion only'. The result thus also holds for such points. Consider
nally any point from the middle region that goes to the left region. Any such point that
satises ca  cp   (p   a + a) will then satisfy ca  a   a (since at the boundary
between the left and middle region, cp = p) and thus remain in the `persuasion only' part.
Any such point that satises ca < cp   (p   a + a) either becomes `persuasion only' or
persuasion and authority. It follows that the Proposition holds for such points. The proof
17for the cases with A-authority are completely analogous. That proves the Proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Since p increases in 
A while a and a are independent
of 
A, the proof that this holds true on a case by case basis is analogous to the proof of
Proposition 2.
However, 
A does aect the boundaries between the dierent authority cases, so that I
now have to show that the Proposition also holds when going from one case to another.
An increase in 
A reduces authority. Consider rst the case with weak persuasion. With
strong authority, the principal uses `persuasion only' when cp  p and ca  a. With
A-authority, she will never use persuasion when cp > p. Moreover, when cp  p, she will
use `persuasion only' at least when ca  a and she will never use `persuasion only' when
ca < a. With 
 
A-authority, she will never use `persuasion only' when cp > p. Moreover,
when cp  p, she will use `persuasion only' i ca  a. Finally, with no authority she
will use only persuasion i cp  p. This proves the result for all transitions between cases
with weak persuasion. The argument for strong persuasion is analogous. That proves the
Proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Note rst that the boundaries between the dierent cases are
independent of P. It thus suces to show this case by case.
The statement for cd < 
A(2A   1) follows directly from the fact that p, a, and a all
increase in P.
The statement for cd  
A(2A   1) in the case with weak persuasion and strong authority
also follows directly from the fact that p increases in P. Consider next the case with
strong persuasion and strong authority. Points that are originally in the cp  p region
remain there and thus keep persuasion. Points that are originally in the cp > p + a can
only increase in persuasion. Consider nally points that are in the middle region. Any such
point that goes to the left region increases in persuasion. Any such point that remains in
the middle region and that satised ca  cp  (p  a +a) will still satisfy that condition
if
















((1   p)A + p(1   A))(pA + (1   p)(1   A))

A(1   A)(2p   1)22
A
so that the result holds for that case if
 
((1   p)A + p(1   A))(pA + (1   p)(1   A))

A(1   A)(2p   1)22
A
Given the similarity of their equilibria, the same condition also works for strong persuasion
and A-authority. So consider nally weak persuasion and A-authority. The above condition
guaranteed that p   a + a increases, so that points originally in the cp  p   a + a
18remain there and thus keep persuasion. Points that are originally in the cp > p can only
increase in persuasion. Points that are originally in the p   a + a < cp  p and
move to the left region also can only increase in persuasion. All that remains is to consider
points in that middle region that stay in that middle region. Any such point that satised

















2((1   p)A + p(1   A))(pA + (1   p)(1   A))

A(1   A)(2p   1)22
A
so that the result holds if
 
2((1   p)A + p(1   A))(pA + (1   p)(1   A))

A(1   A)(2p   1)22
A
which also implies the earlier condition. This concludes the Proposition. 
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